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Abstract
We analyze the central features of economic policies to mitigate climate change. The basic
structure of Pigouvian “carbon pricing” is shown to follow from a standard Hotelling problem
for the intertemporal pricing of an exhaustible resource. We extend this analysis to consider the
strength and timing of research incentives, the costs of implementation delay and the impact of an-
ticipated future technologies on current carbon prices. We study a variety of issues related to the
valuation of climate investments, including uncertainty as to the future timing and distribution of
climate impacts and the appropriate social rate of discount for valuing policies. Under reasonable
circumstances the insurance properties of climate investments may warrant unusually low discount
rates. We use the same framework to argue that policy makers in developing countries will dis-
count the expected returns from climate investments more heavily, because such investments have
weaker insurance value in the developing world.
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1. Introduction 
Energy is essential to the maintenance and spread of economic welfare.  At a 
point in time, individuals in richer countries such as the US and Canada use much 
more energy than individuals in poorer countries.  Over time, long run growth in 
living standards is strongly associated with rising energy use, especially in 
developing countries.1  There is little to indicate that these patterns might change, 
so that future growth and the escape of developing countries from current levels 
of poverty hinge on the existence and use of abundant energy supplies. 
Yet rising worldwide demands for energy run up against new evidence of 
the social costs of energy use.  The broad consensus of scientific research is that 
the continued dependence of economic activity on carbon-based fuels and their 
associated emission of greenhouse gases (GHG) create risks of substantial future 
changes in earth’s climate, along with associated harm to the welfare of future 
generations.  This “new” knowledge of anthropogenic climate change has 
motivated national and international efforts to regulate the use of carbon-based 
energy sources, and to promote the development and use of “clean” energy 
alternatives.  For example, the Obama administration recently “committed” the 
US to achieve an 80 percent reduction in carbon emissions by 2050, even while 
enabling legislation to begin the regulation of such emissions languishes in 
Congress.  In Europe, an incipient “cap-and-trade” market for emissions permits 
is in place, while the state of California is developing unilateral action along the 
same lines.  Broadly-based international efforts have met with little success, as 
evidenced by the failure of the Kyoto (2000) and Copenhagen (2009) negotiations 
to achieve implementable frameworks for reducing GHG emissions. 
These initiatives must confront several daunting challenges to the 
successful design and implementation of a useful energy-climate policy.  First, 
current generations—who are the ones that get to decide—must be convinced that 
the future costs of climate change are worthy of current concern.  This hasn’t been 
achieved.  Second, current generations must agree to forego use of abundant 
                                                
1 Our point is that economic development (almost) universally expands energy use.  Energy use 
per unit of income—sometimes called the “energy intensity” of income—is generally declining, 
both worldwide and within countries.  This reflects both technical advances in energy use and 
changes in the composition of GDP within countries.  But GDP growth rates over long periods 
almost always exceed the rate of decline in energy intensity of GDP, so that overall energy 
demand rises with income, especially in developing countries.  For example, between 1980 and 
2007 GDP growth in China has averaged 10 percent per year, while energy intensity has declined 
at “only” 5.3 percent per year.  The corresponding figures for India are 6.1 percent GDP growth 
and 2 percent decline in energy intensity.  In the U.S. GDP growth has averaged 2.94 percent since 
1980, and energy intensity of GDP has declined at 2.03 percent. For a complete tabulation of 
energy intensity see World Bank data at:  
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.GDP.PUSE.KO.PP.KD
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carbon-based energy sources in order to mitigate uncertain harm to generations of 
the distant future.  We know of no good examples of such sacrifice.  Third, even 
if current generations are convinced that mutual sacrifice would be a good thing, 
effective policies require the largely voluntary yet global cooperation of nations in 
a setting where non-cooperation offers substantial rewards.  Again, we are 
unaware of the success, or even the formation, of similar policies.  
These problems are created by the fact that climate is a “global public 
good.”  In terms of climate impact earth’s atmosphere doesn’t much care where 
GHG emissions come from—a ton of carbon emitted in India has the same impact 
as one from Canada, so the atmosphere is over-used by all in a classic example of 
the tragedy of the commons.  Meaningful efforts to successfully correct this 
externality must then hinge on collective and harmonized action by nations world-
wide.  Yet efforts at cooperation are hampered by the same free-rider incentives 
that created the problem in the first place—the benefits of carbon-based energy 
use are current and highly focused, while the social costs are greatly delayed, 
difficult to (currently) discern or measure, and highly dispersed.  In addition, as 
we argue below, the social costs of climate change and the benefits of mitigation 
policies are not uniform, which leads to divergent valuations of social investments 
in “climate capital.”  This is especially true when, as here, the distributions of 
returns on such social investments are country-specific and highly uncertain.  
Then policies such as widely-discussed carbon taxes or cap-and-trade schemes 
offer much different risk-reward tradeoffs to developing countries, such as China 
or India, than to developed countries like the US.  These divergent valuations help 
explain the current lack of progress in international negotiations over climate 
policy, such as Copenhagen (2009), and what we believe are the limited prospects 
for cooperation going forward. 
From (very) high altitude, the economics of anthropogenic climate change 
is a standard problem of externality—current users of carbon-based fuels do not 
bear the environmental costs of energy consumption, so they use too much of the 
stuff, and too little of “clean” alternatives.  The problem occurs because some 
resource—here the atmosphere—is unpriced and so overused.  The idealized 
textbook market intervention is to price the overused resource, equating the 
private and social costs of its use.  This can be accomplished via a Pigouvian tax 
(or its equivalent) equal to the marginal external cost of using a unit of carbon-
based fuels.  The resulting ideal “carbon-price” would exactly balance the benefits 
of additional carbon emissions, which occur now, against their costs, which are 
spread over the near and distant future.   
This basic solution to the externality problem is familiar and 
straightforward.  It is central to virtually all serious national and international 
2
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policy proposals to deal with climate change, including the Waxman-Markey2 and 
Lieberman-Warner3 bills in the US House and Senate, the design of cap-and-trade 
policies in the EU, and the tentative framework discussed in the recent 
Copenhagen negotiations.  But its conceptual simplicity is superficial—the actual 
design and implementation of such policies faces daunting challenges and 
unresolved questions.  Our analysis seeks to contribute to a number of unresolved 
issues in the design and effects of policies to mitigate climate change.  These 
include: 
1. Valuing future costs: The social costs of current GHG emissions are 
uncertain and spread over the distant future.  How should current policy 
value the costs of climate damage, which will fall mainly on future 
generations?  Should the future benefits of investments in “climate 
capital” be discounted at market rates or, as some have argued, at much 
lower rates?  How will these valuations differ across major countries, the 
large majority of which must cooperate to achieve efficient policy 
outcomes? 
2. Uncertainty:  How does the great uncertainty regarding the extent and 
costs of future environmental harm affect current strategies, social 
investments, and valuations? 
3. Catastrophic climate change:  Among the uncertainties is the possibility of 
catastrophic outcomes that could greatly reduce future living standards or 
endanger future populations. How should current policy value and 
mitigate these possibilities?   
4. Market responses to climate policies:  At its barest level, “carbon pricing” 
is a market-based solution that relies on market responses to efficiently 
designed incentives.  How will markets respond to policy-generated 
incentives?  Will market responses enhance or constrain the effects of 
policies?   
5. Innovation incentives, policy design and the costs of delay:  How does an 
efficient policy affect research incentives and the pace technical progress 
in alternative energy sources and in mitigation?  If technical breakthroughs 
are likely to be the ultimate solution to the energy “problem,” are 
incentives to innovate harmed by delays in implementing an optimal 
policy?  How should the prospect of future innovation affect current 
policy? 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 develops the basic features 
of optimal carbon pricing, which we relate to a standard Hotelling problem for the 
                                                
2 http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-2454
3 http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-2191
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intertemporal pricing of a depleting resource.  We extend the analysis to consider 
the strength and timing of research and development incentives, the costs of delay 
in implementing an optimal policy, and the impact of anticipated future 
technologies, and their form, on current carbon prices.   In Section 3 we analyze a 
variety of issues related to the valuation of climate policies, including uncertainty 
as to the future timing and distribution of climate impacts.  We pay particular 
attention to the appropriate social rate of discount for valuing policies, showing 
that under certain reasonable circumstances the insurance properties of climate 
investments may warrant unusually low discount rates.  We use the same 
framework to argue that policy makers in developing countries will discount the 
expected returns from climate investments more heavily, because such 
investments have weaker insurance value in the developing world.  Section 4 
concludes. 
2. Features of Efficient Climate Change Policies 
The scientific foundations for anthropogenic climate change indicate that current 
emissions of GHGs create environmental and other costs that are (1) greatly 
delayed, (2) very long-lasting, and (3) highly uncertain.4  This is because the flow 
of CO2 to the atmosphere has a long lasting impact on the stock of atmospheric 
CO2, as reabsorption is very slow.  In turn, the growth in global temperature lags 
the atmospheric stock of CO2 because, for example, melting of ice caps reduces 
earth’s albedo (reflectivity) and oceans warm slowly.  Many costs are likely to lag 
a rise in temperature—for example, rising sea levels would be driven by melting 
of ice caps, which would follow a prolonged warming period.  Finally, 
uncertainty as to environmental feedbacks and other impacts includes the 
prospects for “catastrophes” of various forms.  Because of these features, policies 
that would mitigate these effects must balance costs and benefits over hundreds of 
years, and subject to large and costly contingencies, which make the problem of 
policy design a good deal more daunting than the usual project evaluation.   
2.1  Carbon Pricing as an Exhaustible Resource Problem 
To illustrate central elements of dynamic carbon pricing and its connection to key 
assumptions about preferences, growth and technology, consider a simple 
certainty framework in which the target cap on atmospheric concentration of 
GHGs at some endogenous future date T (say in T=200 years) is the goal of 
environmental policy.  Denoting the concentration of GHGs at date t by Qt, this 
                                                
4 See Archer (2007) and (2009) for useful summaries of the state of climate science research on 
global warming. 
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terminal condition is TQ Q .  Stated in this way, the optimal policy solves a 
Hotelling problem for allocating the use of an exhaustible resource over time—
where here the exhaustible resource is the capacity of the atmosphere to “safely” 
hold a given concentration of GHGs.5   
Let the private social (consumer plus producer) surplus from current 
emissions, q, be ( , , )t t t tV q b y where tb  is the unit cost of carbon-free energy 
sources at date t and ty is income.  Finally, let the technology for mitigating 
emissions be represented by the cost 1( )t t tC s  , where ts  is the amount of period-t 
emissions avoided through mitigation activities and t indexes the evolving 
efficiency of mitigation—higher values of t reduce the costs of emissions 
mitigation.  For example, ts might be the amount of period t emissions that are 
eliminated by sequestration or other technologies, and   makes the process more 
efficient.  With these definitions, the policy problem is to maximize the present 
discounted value of social surplus. 
(1)         
1
,
0
( ( , , ) ( ))
. .
rt
t t t t t t tq s
t
t t t t T
MaxW V q b y C s e dt
s t Q q s aQ and Q Q
 


 
   

where r is the rate of interest used to discount future environmental costs (the rate 
of return on investments in environmental capital) and a is the rate at which 
atmospheric GHGs are reabsorbed.  We shall have much more to say about r later, 
but for now we simply take it as given without pondering how large or small it 
could or should be.6   
Letting ( )tV    denote the derivative of ( )tV  with respect to tq , the basic 
solution to (1) has a familiar structure: 
  
                                                
5 There need not be a fixed target level of GHG for this analysis to apply.  As long as the effects of 
climate change are simply a function of the stock of GHG at some future date (200 years in our 
example), the optimal program will need to solve this same Hotelling problem given the optimal 
level of GHG at the terminal date. 
6 The appropriate rate of return on social investments in climate capital will depend on insurance 
properties of the investment’s return.  Projects that pay off by mitigating climate-related 
catastrophes may have discount rates that are well below the market rates of return on other risky 
assets, and even below the risk free rate.  We take up these issues in Section 3, below.  
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(2a)                
( )
0
1 1 ( )
0
( , , )
( )
r a t
t t t t
r a t
t t t t
V q b y P e
C s P e

  
 
   
In (2a) both the marginal value of using and the marginal cost of eliminating a 
unit of emissions are equated to the period-t “carbon price” ( )0
r a t
tP e P
  ,  which 
represents the scarcity value of a “unit” of the otherwise unpriced absorptive 
capacity of the atmosphere.  This price is the outcome of an ideal Pigouvian tax or 
cap-and-trade system, so that tP  equates the marginal benefit of q to current users 
and the (present value of) incremental costs imposed on future generations.7   
2.2  Carbon Pricing, Timing and the Returns to Innovation 
The fact that the socially optimal carbon price rises at the rate of interest (plus 
absorption) is a well-known property of this and other exhaustible resource 
problems—Nordhaus (2007) refers to the rate of growth r+a as the “net carbon 
interest rate.8  It is a condition for intertemporal efficiency in the use and 
mitigation of emissions, equating the value of benefits from creating incremental 
emissions (due to energy use) to the present value of costs.   Less appreciated is 
how this property of an optimal policy impacts the social value of innovations, 
incentives to innovate and the cost of waiting to implement the policy.   
To fix ideas with a not-entirely-fanciful example, think of a current 
investment in technology that could eliminate one unit of carbon emissions at 
some arbitrary future date, t—a one-period “carbon eating tree.”9  The present 
value of this unit reduction in future emissions is ( )0 0
rt r a t rt at
tPe P e e P e
    , 
which implies that the time profile of values is independent of the interest rate, r.  
If a=0, the present discounted value of the innovation is independent of how far 
in the future it pays off, t, because the value of the gain  rises at the interest rate.  
And if a>0 the present value actually rises with t because the time-t value of the 
innovation rises faster than the interest rate.  In effect, the value of the innovation 
is undiscounted. 
The result is even stronger if innovation is scalable.  Think of an 
innovation that would reduce the incremental cost of mitigation at some future t, 
                                                
7 Nordhaus (2007a,b) and (2008) are good summaries of the state of economic modeling applied to 
global warming and climate policy.  Many of the same analytical tools appear in Stern (2006). 
8 The original statement is in Hotelling (1931).  Treating Q as an exhaustible resource, the 
condition is that “owners” of the resource must be indifferent between selling a unit today and 
holding it for future use. Here tP  is the per-period shadow value of relaxing the constraint on 
GHG concentrations, Q . 
9 E.g. Dyson (2008).
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raising t by ln td  >0.  The present value of this cost reduction (per unit change 
in ln  ) is  
                                          
1 1
0
( )rt t t t t
rt
t t
at
t
e C s s
e Ps
P e s
   




  
Here the unit value of the innovation is independent of r, and also of t if a=0, but 
the reduction in incremental cost is scalable because it applies to all units, ts .  But 
ts  rises over time because tP  is increasing, so the present value of the innovation 
also rises with t—the gain has larger present value the farther in the future it 
occurs.  Applied to all periods, a scalable technical advance in mitigation that 
applies from the present day forward is worth 
 (3)                                             ln 0
0
at
t
t
W P s e dt

   
Even with a=0, the value of the gain applies to the quantity of mitigation in all 
future periods with equal weights.  If a>0 then future periods get more weight 
than the present.  And of course the result applies to other types of innovation, 
such as an advance that would improve the consumption efficiency (surplus) per 
unit of emissions, like a change in fuel efficiency of cars.  All such gains are 
valued at the rising Pigouvian price tP , which “undoes” the effect of discounting 
in present value calculations.   
These conclusions may appear anomalous, and it is easy to extend the 
policy problem (1) to include factors that would cause the optimal atmospheric 
price Pt to rise more slowly, so that delay is more costly.  For example, if we 
amend the optimal policy to include possible environmental damages ( )tD Q from 
rising atmospheric concentrations along the trajectory to T, then the current 
optimal carbon price is continuously updated, incorporating the impact of current 
emissions on future damages: 
                                     1ln ( )t t t
d P r a P D Q
dt
      
where ( )tD Q > 0 is the current period marginal damage from emissions, 
equivalent to the effective current period “rental price” of atmosphere.  This 
7
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reduces the growth rate of tP  relative to the standard Hotelling solution, but 
without negating the broader point, which is that innovations yield greatest value 
when the carbon price is high, and in the optimal policy that price is rising over 
time.  
The central lesson about valuing progress in (3) is simple, but it has 
important implications for interpreting both the form of policy responses to 
climate change as well as the urgency with which those policies are implemented 
and the costs of delay.  The slow progress of international negotiations in 
gatherings such as Kyoto and Copenhagen is widely lamented, as is similarly 
slow progress in crafting and adopting enabling legislation in the US and other 
countries.  Do these delays adversely impact incentives to find “solutions” in the 
form of technologies that would reduce the carbon impact of energy 
consumption?  Is a sense of urgency warranted? 
If we assume that slow progress toward implementing a policy is just 
that—slow progress that will eventually result in widely applied carbon pricing 
that reflects social costs—then equation (3) indicates that the costs of delay are 
small.  To illustrate, use (3) for the present discounted value of a cost-saving 
innovation that requires substantial up-front R&D effort.  Realization of these 
incentives requires two things: an initial incentive, 0P , that signals the current 
scarcity value of emissions, and a commitment to a time path for that value in the 
future.  Given these, delaying the start of this payoff for d years would not much 
affect its present value, even if the initial d years of a payoff stream were 
foregone.  And if the whole program is simply pushed back the payoff would 
likely rise because the initial price dP  would increase by more than simple 
interest (because interim unpriced emissions tighten the ultimate constraint), 
which also raises s.  The result is that the current value of innovation incentives 
and the social gain from innovations are not much harmed and may even be 
increased by delay.  
This analysis assumes that an optimal carbon pricing program is 
eventually implemented—that negotiations and legislation result in something 
useful in terms of price signals and commitment to policy.  The message is not 
that delay is costless—the tighter constraint and necessarily higher carbon price 
caused by delay demonstrate the costs—but rather that the returns to climate-
related innovations are not much reduced by delay in implementing well-designed 
incentives.  And if the ultimate efficiency gain is likely to derive from currently 
unforeseen innovations driven by carbon pricing, rather than simply by business 
as usual along a rising price path, it is likely that delays of a few years don’t much 
impact that outcome.  Put differently, it is far more important to get the form of 
policy right—including believable commitments to the level and time path of 
future carbon prices—than to get a policy done quickly. 
8
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2.3  Factors Affecting the Impact of Policy            
Conditions (2a) for the rate of change price of the carbon price embed the 
properties of evolving demand and supply for carbon-based fuels, via the social 
surplus ( )tV z, and the 
evolution of technology.  It’s worth being explicit about these, because 
expectations of how demand and technology will evolve in the future are essential 
ingredients of current policy and the optimal level and timing of mitigation 
activities. Using the usual notation for time rates of change (e.g. dqq
dt
 ) 
displacement of (2a) gives the rates of change of emissions (q) and mitigation (s):  
(2b)             
[ ]
[ ] [1 ]
t t t t tt
t t t t
q r a b y
s r a
  
  
  
 
    
   
Here,   is elasticity of emissions with respect to the cost of its substitute, b,   is 
the income elasticity of demand for emissions generating activities,   is the 
elasticity of mitigation supply (the inverse of the elasticity of marginal cost) and 
  is the price elasticity of current emissions, q, which embeds both supply and 
demand responses to changes in P.10   
Equations (2b) have several important implications.  First, absent technical 
progress in reducing emissions ( 0t
  ) and with negligible reabsorption (a=0), 
the growth rate of mitigation is proportional to the rate of interest.  The factor of 
proportionality is the elasticity of mitigation supply, t , so optimal mitigation 
grows more rapidly when supply is more elastic or when the rate of interest is 
high.  But with t

>0 the growth rate of mitigation is augmented by anticipated 
technical progress (the rate of decline in costs) in emissions reduction.  Given the 
dependence of emissions mitigation on technology and research, and expectations 
that costs of emissions reductions actually will fall over time, this means that 
“waiting” to achieve emissions reductions is a central element of dynamically 
efficient policy.  In a broader context, however, the magnitude of  is 
endogenous to current policy, because it is an outcome of current and future R&D 
                                                
10 In a competitive market   will be given by the harmonic mean of supply and demand 
elasticities, 1 1 1( )S D      .
. ,  as well as changes in the availability of substitutes, 

9
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efforts, and our previous discussion indicates that incentives to innovate are 
powerful, provided that innovators can collect on the value of their innovations.   
Similarly, the benefits of deferral are larger when the elasticity of 
mitigation supply is large, and especially when large values of t  are likely to 
evolve from future technical advances.  Large values of t  mean that marginal 
costs of mitigation at a point in time do not rise sharply with s—mitigation 
activities are easily “scalable”—so there is not much cost to sharply ramping up 
mitigation in later periods when emissions reductions will be most valuable.  But 
when t  is small the marginal cost of mitigation increases rapidly with s—there is 
a large cost penalty if mitigation efforts are concentrated in fewer periods.  Then 
it is worthwhile to do things in smaller pieces by spreading mitigation activities 
over time.  Then the optimal policy is to ramp up mitigation efforts sooner rather 
than later.     
This interpretation of the elasticity t  is the “certainty” equivalent of a 
broader point about scalable technologies—they can be deployed as needed on 
large scale without much cost penalty.  As we show below, development of highly 
scalable (high  ) technologies is especially valuable if we extend the analysis to 
incorporate uncertainty and the possibility that future environmental effects of 
GHGs may turn out to be much  more costly than currently anticipated, or that 
low-probability but high-damage outcomes may occur.   Then scalable 
technologies to reduce emissions have high option value, precisely because they 
can be deployed on a large scale when mitigation is most critical.  Notice also that 
technical advances that enhance scalability ( ) or enhance the efficiency of 
mitigation ( t

) are complementary—the social benefits from higher t

are 
proportional to  , and conversely. 
Similar implications apply to the “value” side of (2b).   Since the price of 
emitting carbon rises at the “net” interest rate r+a, this price rise induces 
conservation in proportion to the price elasticity  .  Note that   embeds both 
production and consumption responses to carbon pricing—for example, the fact 
that carbon-based fuels are abundant and in fairly inelastic supply on the world 
market suggests that  is likely to be small.11  Together with demand growth 
( 0ty
  ) on the world market, the implication is that substantial conservation 
relative to business-as-usual is unlikely.  Then policy success is critically 
dependent on technical advances that would promote mitigation by enhancing 
                                                
11 That is, the burden of P is likely to fall on suppliers of carbon emitting energy sources, who 
would supply roughly the same quantities at substantially lower after-tax prices.  Then imposition 
of emissions pricing may not much impact fuel use or emissions through conservation.
10
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and  , or substitution toward non-carbon-based energy alternatives with 
declining costs ( t tb

< 0).   In other words, the point of optimal emissions pricing 
is not so much to induce conservation on the demand side—which is likely to 
have small effects—as it is to guide the research incentives that will result in 
greater supply of clean energy alternatives in the long run. 
2.4  Evolving Expectations and Changing Incentives 
For a given rate of interest the rate of growth of the optimal carbon price is 
determined.  The other key to incentives is 0P —the initial or current carbon 
price—which determines the level of the entire future price path.  This is affected 
by the entire array of technology and substitution effects, and the way they are 
anticipated to evolve, as in (2b).  Factors that reduce the anticipated growth of q
or raise the growth of s will reduce 0P  and delay the ultimate date T when net 
additions to the stock Q optimally cease.  For example, the expected emergence of 
technologies ( ) that make s more scalable allow for lower net emissions (q-s) 
along a flatter path, making T  longer, and so on.   
The prices Pt that support optimal net emissions in problem (1) could be 
generated by an ideal set of emissions taxes or by cap-and-trade determination of 
an emissions price.  Though we don’t wish to join a full debate over the relative 
merits of carbon taxes versus cap-and-trade schemes—see Nordhaus (2007c) for a 
good discussion—our framework does highlight some key issues that have not 
been emphasized in previous literature.  While we have framed the optimal policy 
in a certainty-equivalent framework, the fact that the optimal initial price, P0, 
depends on expectations of future market responses and technologies means that 
an efficiently updated policy should adjust the current price level, P0, as 
information evolves.  For example, an innovation that reduces expected future 
mitigation costs will reduce P0, exactly as a new “find” that increases the future 
availability of an exhaustible resource (such as oil) will reduce its current price, 
even if the newly discovered units are not currently recoverable.  In an ideal cap 
and trade framework in which total acceptable emissionsQ  (as opposed to year-
by-year emissions) are fixed and unchanging, and tradable over time, the 
collection of information and the formation of expectations about such future 
innovations and technologies is decentralized to market participants—a clear 
advantage in terms of incentives.  But the possibility of governments 
manipulating the variable they control, Q , invites rent-seeking, which is the 
foundation of many economists’ critique of cap-and-trade schemes and their 
consequent preference for tax-based incentives.    
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Yet tax-based schemes also have powerful disadvantages.  Tax-based 
carbon pricing sacrifices the substantial advantage offered by market-based 
expectations—when carbon prices are set by governments the formation of 
“expectations” that determine both the level and growth of the optimal emissions 
tax is necessarily centralized in government, which is responsible for setting and 
updating the entire price (tax) path Pt.  There is little reason to believe that 
governments would do well in this regard, and the opportunities and incentives 
for inefficient choices and rent-seeking appear to us just as powerful with taxes as 
with cap-and-trade. 
2.5  Discounting Future Climate Costs and Returns    
Ignoring reabsorption, a, for any given future marginal damage from incremental 
emissions, say TP  = $500 per ton of CO2 emissions in T=100 years, the strength 
of initial incentives, 0P , is determined by the rate of interest; 0
rT
TP e P
 .  Higher 
r means low 0P  and a gradual ramping up of incentives and responses.  Low r
means that conservation and mitigation efforts are more front-loaded.  If we base 
r on historical market rates of return on physical and human capital, then a value 
in the neighborhood of  r=.06 is reasonable.  This yields 0P =$1.24  if 100 $500P  .  
In contrast, the UK government’s 2006 Stern Review of the Economics of Climate 
Change argued that policies should reflect much lower interest, r = .015, based on 
the Review’s  notion that that it is ethically improper to heavily discount the costs 
that current emissions impose on future generations.  Then the current tax or price 
is .015 1000P $500 e
    = $112, which is almost 100 times larger than with  r=.06.
As pointed out by Nordhaus (2007b) and Weitzman (2007), among others, this 
philosophical choice of a (very) low discount rate for investments in climate 
capital accounts for virtually all of the differences between the Stern Review’s
draconian recommendations for current action and the more gradualist policies 
advocated by other economists.  Much then hinges on the choice of a social rate 
of discount for climate capital, r, which we take up below.12   
3.  Valuing Future Climate Damages 
The fact that current economic activity and policy affect uncertain climate 
outcomes and costs over vast time periods may be the most daunting challenge of 
climate policy.  Possible future outcomes—including the possibility of 
                                                
12 Moreover, since the analysis in the Stern Review assumes that the cost of GHG concentrations 
are proportional to GDP and that GDP grows substantially over time, the implied net discount rate 
is even smaller (and is essentially zero).  See Nordhaus (2007b) for a clear discussion of this issue. 
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environmental catastrophes that could harm large populations or greatly reduce 
productivity—must be both envisioned and valued, and then balanced against the 
current cost of mitigating such harms. 
We address three issues related to the current valuation of uncertain future 
damage.  First, given the possibility of various types of catastrophe, what does 
economic analysis say about the costs that should be incurred today in order to 
avoid them?  At standard discount rates, events that have even substantial impacts 
on productivity and population-wide living standards in the distant future have 
only small present value.  We show that these values substantially increase, 
however, when climate-related damages are unequally distributed, when future 
lives are at risk, and when we allow for uncertainty as to when the damaging 
events might occur (holding constant the expected time to occurrence).  Even at 
“market” rates of discount, not-implausible values for the magnitudes of future 
catastrophes imply substantial current willingness to pay to avoid them. 
We then extend the analysis to the valuation of climate investments with 
uncertain future returns.  We show that appropriate social discount rates for 
investments in climate capital may be well below market returns on other forms 
of capital, reflecting the insurance value of climate investments.  We also find that 
distribution matters.  The global public good nature of harmonized climate 
policies is challenged by heterogeneity of valuations—projects that have high 
insurance value to developed countries because they reduce future risks are likely 
to be much less valuable to developing countries, for whom the possibility of 
rapid economic growth is likely more important. 
3.1  The Costs of Future Catastrophic Outcomes 
  
Future catastrophic outcomes may include substantial damages to productive 
capacity, sustained reductions in economic growth, threats to living standards or 
lives of particular populations, or permanent environmental harm that reduces 
welfare for any given level of economic activity.  To frame these possibilities, we 
begin with the standard infinite-horizon model of intergenerational utility that 
underlies most work in economic growth and climate policy.13  Write the current 
value of generational welfare over the indefinite future as:   
  
(4)                                 0
0
( ) tt
t
U u c e dt

   
                                                
13 Pindyck and Wang (2009) provide a dynamic general equilibrium approach to valuing 
catastrophic outcomes, including parameterized distributions for both the arrival rate and 
distribution of harm from catastrophes.  Weitzman (2009) allows the distribution of future harm 
from climate change to have “fat tails”, which can greatly impact the current value of avoidance. 
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In (4)   is the rate of time preference, or in an intergenerational context the rate 
at which earlier generations discount the well being of later ones, and tc  
represents the per-capita flow of goods and services (consumption) available to 
generations alive at future date t, which may include valuations of environmental 
factors.  We continue to abstract for the moment from issues of uncertainty.  
One form of calamity that can be represented in (4) is a permanent 
reduction in future living standards that is known to commence at some future 
date T, say in 100 years.  So assume that future productivity is reduced by a 
constant percentage, resulting in a permanent change in future consumption of 
lnd c from T onward.  For example ln .01d c    represents a permanent 1-
percent reduction in per-capita income and consumption.  Assume a constant 
elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption,  , and steady state economic 
growth of g.  Then we can apply the Ramsey Equation linking the equilibrium 
interest rate to time preference and economic growth, r g   .  The current 
value of this harm as a fraction of current (time zero) national income is: 
     (5)                                   
( )
0
0 0
1 ln
( )
r g TdU e d c
c u c r g
 
   
where 1( ) lnr g d c is the damage valued at date T and ( )r g Te   discounts the 
date-T value to the present, allowing for economic growth.  How large is (5)?  
Assume  r=.06 and g=.02—fairly standard values in a growth framework—and 
let lnd c =-.01 (a one percent permanent reduction in future incomes).  Then with 
T = 100 years the right side of (5) is equal to -.0046, or about half of one percent 
of current income.  For the US with a national income of about $13 trillion, this 
implies a present discounted value of future harm of about $59 billion.  Viewed as 
a long term project to avoid such damage, the expenditure flow at 6 percent 
interest is about $3.6 billion.   Cutting the horizon to T=50 years substantially 
impacts the estimates.  Then a permanent 1 percent reduction in future income is 
worth about 3.4 percent of current income ($440 billion), or a flow expenditure of 
$26.4 billion per year. By comparison, with these same parameters a current 
permanent reduction in consumption of one percent would be worth roughly 
$3.25 trillion or a flow of expenditure equal to roughly $195 billion per year. 
Adding uncertainty about when such climate-related damages might occur 
substantially raises the present value of avoiding them.14  To demonstrate this in a 
simple way, hold constant the expected time until damage occurs at T=100 years, 
but assume that the damage is equally likely to commence at any future date.  
                                                
14 Karp (2009) makes a related point. 
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This implies an arrival rate (hazard) for the damaging event of 1h T  .  The 
present value of future expected damages as a fraction of current income is then: 
(6)                 0
0 0
1 1 1 ln
( ) 1 ( )
dU d c
c u c r g T r g
     
Using the same values as above, a permanent 1 percent reduction in living 
standards with expected time to occurrence of  T=100 years has present value 
equal to 5 percent of current income, which is roughly 11 times greater than when 
the damage was known to commence in 100 years.  This is worth about $650 
billion to the US in 2010, equivalent to a flow expenditure of $39 billion per year 
at 6 percent interest.  At T=50 (h=.02) the cost is 8.3 percent of current national 
income, or a flow of $65 billion.  Our point is that uncertainty over the time at 
which climate change will have an adverse effect can greatly increase its current 
valuation.  
Formulas (5) and (6) express the current value of marginal losses in future 
per capita consumption—everyone consumes one percent less than otherwise.  
This is consistent with most of the existing analysis of valuing climate costs, 
where those costs are framed in terms of reductions in future GDP, or costs as a 
fraction of GDP, as if the burden of climate impacts is equally spread among the 
future population.  But much of the concern about climate-related damages has to 
do with the distribution of harm, where some groups are harmed much more than 
others.  Concave u(c) means that reductions in c have rising marginal cost to those 
who experience them, so a given reduction in aggregate income is more costly 
when it is highly concentrated.  For example, with  =2 a catastrophe that reduces 
incomes by half among 2 percent of the population is twice as costly as an across-
the-board reduction in living standards of one percent, even though both events 
reduce overall per-capita income by the same amount (one percent).  Taken a step 
further, a climate-related catastrophe that reduces future national incomes by one 
percent by killing off one percent of the population, while leaving others 
unharmed, may be very costly.  Such catastrophes are not “marginal,” reducing 
everyone’s income proportionally.  Instead they wipe out consumer surplus—or 
in the extreme case the value of life—for a swath of the population.  
A framework for valuing such catastrophes is provided by the economic 
literature on the value of a statistical life (VSL), which measures people’s 
willingness to pay for a reduction in the probability of death that would save one 
“statistical life.”  For example, if in a population of 10,000 persons each would be 
willing to pay $600 per year to reduce the per-year probability of accidental death 
by 1 in 10,000, then VSL = $6 million, which is about the value used by the US 
Environmental Protection Agency for cost-benefit analyses of regulations or 
projects that would reduce mortality risks.  Murphy and Topel (2006) use this 
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value to calibrate the value of a life-year ( ) ( ) / ( )v c u c u c , which is the 
“consumer surplus” achieved by being alive and consuming amount c, where c 
includes leisure and other factors that people value.  They find that the value of a 
life year is about six times current income, so if we think of ( ) ( )v c c c  the data 
suggest that ( )c 6 at current income levels.  Then the above calculations 
would increase by at least a factor of 6 for life-threatening events that cause an 
equally-calibrated reduction in future “income.” 
The analyses in Murphy and Topel (2006) and Hall and Jones (2007) also 
indicate that ( )c  rises with income, so the value of life is income elastic.  Then 
if future generations are richer than us, the value of lives saved from mitigating 
future catastrophes will be proportionally greater than today.  For example, an 
income elasticity of  =1.2 and long run economic growth at 2 percent yields 
( )c 9.0 in 100 years.  The result is that a randomly occurring event that causes 
a “concentrated” change in future costs because of climate-related mortality has 
much higher current value: 
         (7)                        0 0
0 0
( )1 1 ln
( ) 1 ( )
dU c d c
c u c r g T r g

      
With a constant hazard rate and an expected arrival time of  T = 100 years, with 
1.2   and 0( )c =6, a “catastrophic” event that reduces per-capita output by 
killing off dlnc = -.01 of the population has present value equal to 36 percent of 
current income.  Letting T = 1000—a catastrophe that could occur every thousand 
years, on average—the current value is about 4.5 percent of income.  And of 
course the value is highly sensitive to the choice of r: a reduction in the discount 
rate from .06 to .04 raises the current value of avoiding such a catastrophe from 
4.5 percent to 22 percent of current income. 
These results indicate that uncertainty over the future timing, magnitude 
and distribution of losses from climate change can greatly impact our assessments 
of current cost, even if future costs are discounted at conventional rates of return 
of, say, 6 percent.   
3.2  Discounting the Returns on Climate Capital 
  
One of the most controversial aspects of debates over climate change policy is the 
appropriate social discount rate to be applied to future damages.  At the extreme 
among economists, the Stern Review’s advocacy for a very low interest rate of  
r=.015 accounts for almost all of its severe recommendations.  Behind the Stern
Review recommendations is the notion that the welfare of future generations 
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should be weighted equally with current ones, it being ethically repugnant (in 
Stern’s view) to discount their welfare.  Then the only source of a positive 
discount rate on real cash flows is the growth of consumption over time, because 
future generations are richer than we and utility is concave— >0  in our earlier 
notation.  And in the Stern recommendations even that is given little weight in 
reaching the desired result.  Similarly, non-economists such as Archer (2009) 
have argued that economic analysis is itself ill-equipped to deal with 
intertemporal valuations spanning a generation or more.  Like Stern, Archer 
argues for effectively zero discounting because current action is a moral 
imperative. 
The slowly ramping policy profiles offered by Nordhaus (2008) and others 
are based on higher discount rates that reflect historical long run returns on other 
types of capital.  In contrast, while critiquing the analytical foundations of the 
Stern rates, Weitzman (2009) offers a “Dismal Theorem” based on the possibility 
of extreme catastrophes that drive consumption near zero and the marginal utility 
of consumption beyond the moon.  Policies that can avoid such outcomes can 
have unbounded value under particular assumptions about the distribution of 
climate effects on c—they should have “fat tails”—and the rate at which marginal 
utility rises as consumption falls.  The more general and useful point is that 
uncertainties about the distributions of climate damage and the payoffs from 
mitigation investments may greatly affect valuations.  Climate policies that 
effectively insure against large downside risks (when the marginal utility of 
consumption would be large) needn’t have large expected returns, so the typical 
market benchmarks for r might be inappropriate for valuing investments in 
climate capital.  We return to this point shortly.  
From an economic and empirical perspective the choice of a discount rate 
is not about the philosophical choice of the correct ethical weight to be applied to 
the welfare of our and other peoples’ great-grandchildren, nor is it about the way 
we “should” discount marginal dollars of their income because they will be richer.  
As in all analyses that must balance costs and benefits, the issue is opportunity 
cost.  The fact that costs and returns are so uncertain and widely spaced in time 
adds practical difficulties but not conceptual ones. 
Consider a current project costing $1 million that would reduce the impact 
of climate change 100 years from now.  Assume that, absent the project, the 
resulting climate change would impose a real cost of $20 million on future 
generations.   The logic of Stern (2006) and Archer (2009) suggests that we 
should implement the project if, and only if, we value giving $1 to the current 
generation less than we value giving $20 to the future generation.  That is, the 
question of whether the mitigation project is worthwhile allegedly depends on the 
relative values we place on the consumption of current and future generations.  
17
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This is not correct—our choice does not depend on our relative preference for 
current versus future generations. 
Assume we wish to give the future generation the $20 million benefit they 
would derive were we to implement the project today.   If undertaken, the rate of 
return on the current project is 3 percent, which is the solution for r in the 
equation $1x 100re = $20.  But if the market rate of interest is 6 percent, $1million 
invested at the market rate of return would yield $403 million in 100 years, 
compared to the $20 million benefit generated by the climate mitigation project. 
This means that future generations would gain (a lot) if the current generation 
were to forego the climate project and invest in other assets that yield higher 
returns.  Alternatively, it would take only $49,000 invested at 6 percent to provide 
the future generation with the $20 million needed to compensate them for the 
harm from climate change.  Our point is that it is the market rate of return—not 
our attitudes toward future generations or our moral view of discounting—that 
determines the appropriate discount rate.  To evaluate climate mitigation policy 
with a lower rate of return unnecessarily harms either current or future 
generations, or both.  Future generations would not thank us for investing in a 
low-return project. 
It is appropriate to discount the costs and benefits of climate change 
policies at a “market” rate of return because the market rate measures the 
opportunity cost of such investments—returns available from investing the same 
amount in physical or human capital—so long as such opportunities exist.  But 
what “market rate” should we use?  At the low end one might benchmark by the 
risk free rate as represented by the returns on government bonds.   An alternative 
would be the much higher historical returns on risky investments such as physical 
capital or equities.  Offered the opportunity to invest for the benefit of our great-
grandchildren in 2110—who by any reasonable expectation will be much richer 
than us15—would we opt for Treasury bills and an annual return of perhaps 3 
percent when the historical equity premium consistently provides long run returns 
in the neighborhood of 6 to 8 percent?  Most would choose equities. 
Yet the fact that most of us would choose equities reflects an implicit but 
appropriate (in this context) belief that those assets correctly gauge the 
opportunity cost for long-term financial investments, including allowance for risk.  
The weakness in this argument is that it is not obvious that the risks and returns 
on climate investments align with those on other physical assets or equities.  If the 
returns on climate investments are uncorrelated with returns on the market 
portfolio, or if by eliminating calamitous harm to overall productivity and living 
standards climate investments pay off exactly when other productive assets do 
                                                
15 At 1.5 percent annual growth, per capita income in 2110 will be about 4.5 times the current 
level. At 2 percent the multiple is 7.4.  Growth rates in developing countries such as China or 
India are expected to be much higher.  
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not, then the appropriate rate of return and discount rate for climate projects 
should be lower than for other assets, perhaps even lower than the risk-free rate.  
Further, though the climate impacts of investments in climate capital are global, 
the risk properties of those effects, and hence their value, may differ greatly 
across the countries whose participation in global agreements is essential. 
3.3  Expected Social Returns on Climate Capital 
The risk properties of the returns on climate investments derive from at least four 
stochastic drivers: (1) global economic growth, because greater growth likely 
means greater emissions; (2) the impact of emissions on climate; (3) the impact of 
climate on environment, productivity and welfare; and (4) the effectiveness of 
current investments in mitigating future harm. 
To illustrate the determinants of an appropriate discount rate for climate 
investments, consider a standard asset pricing framework for valuing a current 
(time 0) project that offers uncertain returns at some future date, F.16  Assume that 
the current generation can invest in   units of a climate project, with current cost 
( )K   and marginal cost ( ) ( )k K  .  The investment offers uncertain future 
returns of x per unit, where x may be interpreted as the project’s future impact on 
GHG concentrations, or other measures that would mitigate climate impacts.  
With this setup, the social planner’s intertemporal problem is  
(8)                0 0( ( ), ) ( ), ( )F FMax U u y K E u y x x             
The representative individual in (8) derives utility from income (consumption) y
and the state of the environment  , both of which can be affected by current 
climate investments.   The factor  <1 reflects pure time preference between the 
present (t=0) and future (t=F), and E is the expectations operator reflecting 
uncertainty over the joint distributions of  y,   and x.  We interpret this social 
valuation problem as country-specific, so that the distributions of outcomes may 
be quite different for, say, China than for the US. 
 The choice of investment in the climate project solves 
(9)                                       
 
 
( )
( ) cov ,f
F F
r
F F F
k E m X
e E X m X



   
                                                
16 See Cochrane (2005) for a clear presentation of asset pricing and discounting issues. 
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where fr is the risk-free rate of return, Fm is the marginal rate of substitution 
between future and current consumption, and FX is the future generation’s value 
of the income and environmental payoffs on the investment: 
(10)                         ( )F F F FX y x     
where /F yu u    is future willingness to pay for environmental improvements.  
Divide (10) by ( )k   to obtain marginal returns per dollar invested 
( / ( )F FR X k  ) and solve for the required return on the environmental asset, 
which yields the familiar CAPM form for required expected returns on the 
investment, Er : 
(11)                            ,
,
cov( , )
( )
(1 )( )
E f F F
f m R M f
M m R M f
r r m R
r r r
r r r


 
  
   
In (11), Mr   is the market rate of return on equities and var( )M fr r m   is the 
equity premium.  The term , cov( , ) / var( )m R m R m   is the environmental 
project’s “beta.”  We have expressed   in terms of the covariance of R with m
instead of the more traditional covariance with growth in income because of the 
presence of environment in welfare, ( )u .  
According to the third line in (11), the required expected return on the 
environmental asset will be smaller than the market rate so long as its market 
“beta” ( ,m R ) is smaller than 1.0.  This has the usual risk-return interpretation—
if the environmental asset offers greater payoff than the market when m is high, 
then it reduces risk and should have a lower than market expected return.  While 
this may seem likely, so E Mr r  is plausible, the first line of (11) offers a more 
aggressive point about risk and return for investments in climate projects—the 
expected return on an environmental project may fall below the risk-free rate if 
cov( , )m R >0.  Because m falls with income, positive covariance of m and R is not 
relevant for most financial assets.  But climate projects are alleged to have the 
potential of averting disasters, so they may pay off precisely in states of the world 
where willingness to pay, m, is greatest.  For example, if climate change may 
greatly reduce future productivity and living standards, or cause widespread harm 
and death in some states of nature, then projects that avert such outcomes (see 
equation (10)) may be highly valued even if the payoff is rare—they have low 
.
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expected return but high market value because they pay off when mitigation of 
damage is most valuable.  
3.4  Scalable Technologies and the Effectiveness of Current Investments 
Our earlier discussion emphasized the importance of “scalable” technologies in 
mitigating extreme climate outcomes.  Scalable technologies are particularly 
likely to warrant low rates of discount because they can greatly reduce the risk of 
extreme climate outcomes. This point can be demonstrated in the current context 
by putting a bit more structure on the form of future environmental harm and the 
technology of mitigation. 
Let future income in the absence of mitigation be F F F Fy y Q  , where 
FQ is the future stock of global atmospheric GHGs above some base and F > 0 is 
the extent of future economic damage per unit of FQ .
17  Both FQ  and F  are 
currently unknown— FQ  is determined by global economic growth and carbon-
based energy use, while the distribution of F  represents current uncertainty 
about the future cost of GHG concentrations.   Their interaction means that 
extreme values of F  can cause future environmental “catastrophes” when FQ  is 
large.   In anticipation of such damage, we assume that the current generation can 
invest in units of climate capital,  , which can be combined with future variable 
inputs FZ  to mitigate ( , )F FG Z  units of environmental harm once  FQ  and F
are known.  For example, FG may represent units of FQ removed from the 
atmosphere, or emissions that are avoided by deploying clean energy 
technologies.  Assume that mitigation has constant returns, so 
( , ) ( )F F F FG Z g z  , where /z Z  .   Let F  be the fixed future cost of 
deploying the technology.  If deployed, future income net of mitigation is: 
(12)                          ( )F F F F F F Fy y Q g z z        
Let ( )Fg z  be iso-elastic; 
1( )F F F Fg z A z
 , where FA  is the unknown future 
productivity of currently chosen environmental capital.  Then the optimal date-F 
choice of z yields 
(13)   1 1F F F F F F Fy y Q A
           
                                                
17 If future harm is convex in FQ  then average harm per unit, ( )F FQ , will be increasing in FQ .  
We ignore this so not to complicate the analysis. 
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where 1(1 )      is the elasticity of supply of mitigation, which indexes the 
scalability of the investment project—a perfectly scalable (constant marginal cost) 
project has 1  .  The marginal return on the environmental asset is then 
 1
( )
F F
F
A
R
k

 

 .18  According to (13), the extent of mitigation increases with the 
scale of the investment in climate capital,  , the state of future productivity, FA , 
and with  the damage from future GHG concentrations, F .  For given values of 
FA , and F , mitigation is greater when the project is more “scalable”—that is, 
when   is large. 
Some investments such as reducing current GHG emissions are not 
scalable in that they cannot be cheaply adjusted once the values of FA  and F  are 
realized;   is small and marginal cost rises sharply with mitigation efforts.  
Others—such as development of clean energy technologies or investments in the 
capacity to remove carbon from the atmosphere or sequester emissions—can be 
deployed in large scale based on the future demand for climate mitigation.  A 
perfectly scalable technology,  =1, would provide a great deal of insurance by 
effectively truncating the distribution of harm in what would otherwise be the 
most damaging states of nature, when F  is large, yielding F F Fy y   because 
excess concentrations of GHG are eliminated.  Even technologies that are not 
perfectly scalable can have substantial value.  Larger values of 1(1 )      
mean that the payoff from implementing the technology is more sensitive to the 
realized marginal value of environmental improvements, F , which enhances the 
positive covariance between m and R .  This further reduces the implied rate of 
discount for such projects because highly scalable technologies provide additional 
insurance—they are deployable as needed by varying FZ .  The magnitude of this 
advantage depends on the uncertainty about F  (and FA ).  Greater uncertainty 
raises the (current) value of ex-post scalability.      
This is our earlier point about the value of scalable technologies—research 
and development investments in mitigation technologies that can be deployed in 
large scale in the event that damages are large can offer important insurance 
against looming catastrophe.  Such projects should not be heavily discounted.  
                                                
18 With fixed cost, F , RF=0 for low values of A and  because the technology will not be 
deployed.  At the other extreme, marginal returns are zero when A and  are very large, or when 
 is large, because all excess emissions are mitigated.   It is also plausible that scalable (high ) 
technologies are more costly to develop, so current costs are ( , )K   .  
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More broadly, much of the discussion surrounding climate investments stresses 
that they are meant to avert future catastrophes, which we interpret to mean that 
they yield dividends when willingness to pay, m, is highest.  Our analysis 
provides a positive economic case for discounting them lightly.  This is, we think, 
the less extreme and more relevant implication of Weitzman’s “Dismal Theorem” 
analysis. 
3.5 Heterogeneous Valuations 
Much has been made of the fact that effective climate policies require harmonized 
international efforts, because earth’s atmosphere is a global public good.  Free-
riding and the tragedy of the commons aside, our analysis suggests an additional 
impediment to cooperation and harmonization, based on heterogeneous valuations 
of climate investments between developed and developing countries. 
Consider China (CH) and the United States (US) as extremes of the 
relevant development scale.   In terms of our notation above, any reasonable 
growth scenario implies CH USm m ; that is, China will continue to grow faster 
than the US, so the ratio of future to current marginal utility of consumption is 
lower in China.  And states of nature where China grows fastest correspond to the 
smallest values for CHm —these are the good states of nature from China’s 
perspective, because they are rich.   The danger of harmful climate outcomes 
increases with global GHG emissions, which increase with economic growth.  So 
it is reasonable to assume that future GHG concentrations will be greatest if China 
(and India, and others) grows rapidly, possibly approaching the living standards 
and energy consumption now observed in the US.  This means that “good” states 
of nature from China’s growth perspective are, climate-wise, most damaging to 
the US, especially if US living standards are harmed.  Climate projects valued 
highly by the US because of strong insurance properties ( cov( , )USm R  is high) 
may have little current value to China because cov( , )CHm R is weak or even 
negative.   In effect, a world with greater climate damage is one in which China 
gets rich, and they are more willing to bear the future cost that the US would like 
to avoid. 
This discussion can be framed in terms of current efforts to establish a 
harmonized price for carbon emissions.  With rapid economic growth, China’s 
real future willingness to pay for a unit reduction in GHG concentrations may be 
equal to that of the US.  But China discounts this return more heavily, because it 
only occurs when China prospers.   Expressed as a preference for a current tax on 
GHG emissions, policy makers in China and the rest of the developing world will 
rationally prefer a lower (or no) tax that is less of a hindrance to attaining 
prosperity, while the US and other developed countries prefer a higher tax that 
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insures the prosperity they already have.  Even ignoring other challenges to 
international accord, the likelihood of an effective global policy in such a world 
appears to us slim. 
4.  Conclusions   
The basic designs of economic policies to mitigate anthropogenic climate change 
and its effects are not novel.  They are rooted in well-understood methods for 
dealing with externalities, which remedy market failure by pricing an otherwise 
over-used resource—here the capacity of the atmosphere to safely absorb GHG 
emissions.  Implementing such policies is more challenging, for two basic 
reasons.  First, the external costs of GHG emissions are global rather than local, 
so useful policies that would price or regulate current emissions require 
harmonized action worldwide.  Second, the harms that policies seek to value and 
internalize are both highly uncertain and spread over future generations—all of 
the benefits of using carbon-based energy occur today, while the possible social 
costs are far removed. 
Our analysis has sought to extend previous work on both the form and 
substance of climate policies, particularly in the area of valuing uncertain future 
costs of GHG emissions and the benefits of policies that would mitigate those 
costs.   An important finding is that  “gradualist” policies advocated by most 
economists—setting a low initial emissions price that would rise at a “market” 
rate of interest—are based on the implicit assumption that returns on climate 
investments have a similar payoff structure to other forms of investment in 
physical or human capital.  This assumption ignores the possible insurance value 
of social investments in climate capital, which may pay off precisely when other 
forms of capital do not.  
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